As announced, on May 14th we started the upgrade to eduVPN 2.0. It didn’t all go as smooth as hoped, but also not totally unexpected due to the complexity of the upgrade scenario. The option to perform a clean installation was only taken by the Norwegian server operator by setting up a server in parallel before and “migrating” to it on the 14th. Looking back, this was by far the best approach and should have been taken by all servers. The upgrades in Denmark, Ukraine and Uganda worked without big problems and didn’t need support, except a reminder to Uganda that you can’t reuse the old configuration files as-is and help Denmark with the new way administrators for the portal are configured.
The Netherlands and Australia
Upgrading the Dutch server took longer than expected, I optimistically thought it would take around 10 minutes, but in the end we managed to be back up within the hour. The delay was for the most part due to it running on two servers, one for the “portal” and one for the OpenVPN processes. Also 20+ minutes were wasted on a simple typo in one of the configuration files configuring SAML. The Australian server, also managed by us, was easy as it was running on single server.
The German server had some more trouble. First, the
remove_1.0_debian.sh script was not properly tested by us and thus failed to remove all components necessary which left some old packages and configuration files installed preventing the
deploy_debian.sh script for 2.0 to successfully complete. The other problem was restoring SAML. The mod_auth_mellon (Mellon) authentication module for eduVPN changed and removed some functionality that turned out to be critical for the German deploy, or actually all deployments using “mesh” federations. Due to the wrong initial documentation on how to configure SAML, the “Name ID” was used to determine the unique user identifier. This has long been superseded by the
eduPersonTargetedID, which in turn is superseded by the Subject Identifier Attributes Profile, the latter, not yet being widely supported by identity federations at the moment.
Due to Mellon not supporting any form of “scoping”, i.e. binding and enforcing identifiers to a particular IdP, the 1.0 release had a hack that prefixed the user identifier and permissions with the entity ID of the IdP. This was removed for the 2.0 release as we expected VPN servers operating in a mesh federation to switch to Shibboleth. But as the documentation for eduVPN in combination with Shibboleth is not finished yet, and due to the complexity of the migration to Shibboleth, this was not something that could be done in a few minutes.
Switching to the experimental embedded php-saml-sp module also failed. The virtual platform initially did not expose the AES-NI instruction to the guest, so hardware accelerated AES-256-GCM support was not available. Once this was resolved, it turned out the IdPs in the federation do not have a way to find out which algorithms are supported by an SP. As the algorithm support for php-saml-sp is deliberately quite limited, this was also not an option. Stuck between a rock and a hard place…
Back to Mellon was the only short term option and we applied a hotfix to take the IdP of the user in consideration again to make sure there could not be any collisions or user impersonation. Unfortunately that still didn’t work, because we ran into a Mellon problem on Debian where the
AuthnRequest was signed incorrectly and thus the messages got rejected by the IdPs. Turning off signed
AuthnRequests solved that problem. As it is currently not possible to switch the user identifiers to
eduPersonTargetedID the hotfix was extends to also support the “Name ID” again. Luckily the service is a pilot in Germany 😀
Don’t remove functionality that installed servers depend on without having a properly tested alternative. Make upgrades easier to perform.
The big problem with upgrading from 1.0 to 2.0 was that so many things changed that it was almost impossible to automate this. As the number of server was so small, we decided not to invest in this. For the upgrade to 3.0 we try to take a different approach: no configuration format changes during the life of 2.0.
This will still be difficult when using e.g. SAML, where there are also external components like Mellon and Shibboleth involved where we can’t automatically update the configuration. So, authentication backends will remain a weak point. This is also one of the reasons we started developing php-saml-sp, as a “embedded” SAML that won’t have this problem and can perform reliable upgrades. Hopefully all mesh federations can implement support for announcing supported encryption algorithms to their IdPs in time for the 3.0 upgrade…